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Abstract 
Producer revenue is simultaneously simulated for several hundred county-specific representative 
farms.  The effects of current and alternative commodity programs are analyzed.  In particular, two 
variations of revenue-triggered programs similar to plans proposed by the National Corn Growers 
Association are evaluated.   
Keywords: Risk, commodity policy, simulation, JEL codes: Q180  
Introduction 
The nature of farming presents producers with management challenges that include 
endemic risks.  These risks include both price and yield uncertainty, either of which can lead to 
revenue variability.  The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, commonly known as 
the 2002 farm bill, is the legislation responsible for the current support programs in place that are 
designed to help farmers manage risk.  The 2002 farm bill is scheduled to expire in 2007, and 
several proposals have already been suggested by various groups such as the National Corn 
Growers Association and the American Farmland Trust to supplant the current legislation.  The 
American Farmland Trust, in part, is proposing a safety net that combines a government revenue-
based program with private individual revenue insurance.  Presently, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) uses price-triggered subsidy programs to buffer the price risk faced by 
farmers. These programs include counter-cyclical payments, direct payments, and loan deficiency 
payments.  Additionally, crop insurance programs provide another layer of protection that has 
traditionally mitigated yield risk, but in the last decade also began covering revenue risk.  The 
decision to retain, modify, or completely change current policies will be made in the context of 
tight budgets, relatively high commodity prices, and World Trade Organization (WTO) 
constraints.   During these debates, economists are being called upon to provide analysis of proposed 
plans. The commodity programs in place today are often assessed through the use of stochastic 
modeling.  A well-known and widely used simulation is the Farm Level Income and Policy 
Simulation Model, or FLIPSIM (Richardson).  According to the Agricultural and Food Policy 
Center, FLIPSIM “uses accounting equations, identities and probability distributions to simulate 
the annual economic activities of a representative or actual farm over a multiple-year planning 
horizon.”  Similarly, Miller, Barnett, and Coble and Lence and Hayes designed models that 
analyze policy by simulating farm revenue and aggregate prices. 
Another set of models widely used in policy simulations include aggregate price models 
such the multi-equation econometric model of FAPRI and USDA models such as that of Westcott, 
Young, and Price.  Westcott, Young, and Price used the USDA-ERS Food and Agricultural Policy 
Simulator (FAPSIM) to show the impact of implementing the 2002 farm bill.  Aggregate price 
models, such as FAPRI and FAPSIM, have been quite effective at modeling national prices for 
programs such as the season average price-triggered counter-cyclical payment program because 
prices are highly correlated across regions.   
However, recent debates reflect the rising popularity of the idea of a revenue-based subsidy 
program.  The first such plan was released by Babcock and Hart of Iowa State University, with a 
more recent discussion found in a paper from Paulson and Babcock.  Paulson and Babcock 
evaluate the cost and effectiveness of implementing GRIP as a standing disaster program apart 
from the federal crop insurance program.  Similarly, the National Corn Growers Association built 
a proposal incorporating area revenue components.  Proposals of this nature present a number of 
challenges.  First, benefits are driven by a mix of farm and county revenue variability so both must 
be modeled.  Because revenue risk is dependent on yield risk the results can be quite heterogeneous across locations, making the assessment of how many representative farms are 
sufficient to judge to welfare implications of these proposals difficult.  Further, aggregate cost is 
always a key issue for policy makers.  With diffuse benefits, entities such as the Congressional 
Budget Office will likely have great difficulty assessing such programs.    
This paper reports a model that simulates representative crop revenue from each of 
hundreds of counties in the U.S.  The models incorporate important characteristics like price and 
yield risk and include county and other aggregate stochastic variables.  Importantly, the system is 
designed to maintain spatial correlations across locations to maintain consistent aggregation of the 
results. 
The model analyzes how changing the parameters of counter-cyclical payments and other 
programs will affect a farm’s revenue distribution and individual producer welfare.  The model 
also evaluates proposals for alternative farm subsidy programs for the 2007 farm bill and reports 
the cost to taxpayers for various programs.  The next section briefly reviews literature relevant to 
the policy issues analyzed.  The methods section then describes the stochastic simulation 
procedures and the policies analyzed.  The results section reports farm program payouts and the 
risk-reducing effects of current commodity programs relative to the NCGA proposal as well as the 
risk reduction for producers generated by the alternatives examined.  Finally, the conclusions 
assess the policy implications of the findings. 
Literature Review 
  The literature reviewed in this section is divided into two categories.  The first contains 
background information on the current farm subsidy program and various programs proposed for 
the 2007 farm bill.  The second section reviews the methods used by other simulation programs.  Finally, this section examines the conclusions made by previous literature, along with the 
problems, to guide the direction of this study. 
Subsidy Programs
This subsection examines the three types of subsidy programs currently in place: loan 
deficiency payments (LDPs), counter-cyclical payments, and direct payments.  One idea suggested 
for the next farm bill is a revenue-based farm program, which is also discussed in this subsection. 
  The passage of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) in 2002 allowed for 
the continuation of marketing assistance loans and LDPs from the 1996 farm bill.  However, some 
changes were made to loan rates and payment rates (Anderson).  LDPs are paid on actual 
production whereas direct payments are paid on the product of a producer’s program yields and 85 
percent of the farm’s base acres.  A new program offered by FSRIA is the counter-cyclical 
payment program, designed to provide payments when the national season average price is equal 
to or above the loan rate but less than the target price minus the direct payment rate.  Thus, 
counter-cyclical payments are maximized once the season average price falls to the loan rate.  
Further, these payments are paid on the product of a producer’s program yields and 85 percent of a 
farm’s base acres, both of which are decoupled from current plantings.   
  Miller, Barnett, and Coble study producer preferences for counter-cyclical payments and 
conclude that the assumption that producers prefer counter-cyclical payments to fixed payments is 
often overstated.  Their method for analyzing farm policy is different from other programs in that it 
includes producer risk aversion and yield-price correlations.  Including the correlations, results 
indicate that policy can affect different regions in different ways, which will play a role in 
discussions about a revenue-based farm program.     A revenue-based farm program idea has been mentioned during recent farm bill debates, 
which indicate this policy option is gaining more attention than previously.  The reason this type of 
program is gaining supporters is because of the current situation involving the WTO. 
According to Babcock and Hart a revenue-based program would “meet the proposed U.S. 
limits on trade-distorting subsidies with a high degree of probability.”  Babcock and Hart call for a 
complete redesign of U.S. farm policy.  They claim a revenue target, not a price target, triggering 
support would reduce the number of years that farm revenue falls to an unacceptable level. 
  Coble and Miller look at several implications of a revenue-based subsidy plan.  They point 
out that since the way a revenue-based policy would be implemented is unknown, how the 
program would fit into WTO “boxes” is also unknown.  Another issue is that the primary 
advocates of revenue-based programs are generally located in the Corn Belt.  Producers of 
traditional crops in the South such as rice and cotton tend to prefer price-based programs, much 
like the current programs.  They claim this dichotomy occurs because areas where prices and 
yields are not negatively correlated respond better to programs that separate price risk from yield 
risk.  However, Coble and Miller also note that revenue-based programs would affect the 
distribution of program benefits as revenue risk is greatest in regions and crops where yield risk is 
the greatest. 
  The National Corn Growers Association recently released their proposal for new farm 
programs.  The group proposes several courses of action from updating and modifying current 
programs to creating a new program referred to as Base Revenue Protection (BRP).  BRP is based 
on net farm revenue and would be triggered when net revenue falls more than 30 percent below the 
previous five-year average.  The counter-cyclical payment program is changed to form the 
Revenue Counter-cyclical Program (RCCP).  RCCP closely resembles the Group Risk Insurance Plan (GRIP).  These programs are similar in that they both are triggered when county prices are 
low, but unlike GRIP, RCCP is based on a fixed trigger price and not current futures prices.   
Simulation Methods 
  A well-known and widely used simulation is the FLIPSIM model.  FLIPSIM was 
developed in 1981 by James Richardson and uses a panel farm process, by which producers give 
actual farm information in a three- to four-hour session that is used to create a representative farm 
for their area.  After the model is run, an income statement, cash flow, balance sheet, and federal 
and state income tax summaries are given.  The program is able to summarize more than 200 risks 
faced by the business.  
Miller, Barnett, and Coble use a nonparametric bootstrapping approach to simulate farm 
revenue.  According to Miller, Barnett, and Coble this approach has both positives and negatives.  
The downside is that it is less efficient if the distribution patterns are known, but on the upside the 
model does not make assumptions about what the distribution is. Therefore such a model does not 
make biased or inconsistent estimates.  Their analysis examines two representative farms at two 
separate locations, but could be changed for application to a larger geographic region. 
Methods 
The main objective of this paper is to model farm revenue for a large number of correlated 
representative farms.  Farm revenue is defined as the product of yield and price.  In this section, 
the steps used to calculate yield and price will be discussed, along with how government payments 
will be added to the farm revenue equation.  A non-parametric approach will be used. 
  The first step in calculating farm yield is to create a matrix containing de-trended county 
level yields.  De-trended yields were found by taking NASS county yields from 1975 to 2004 and 
performing a regression analysis with county-level yields as the dependent variable.  A quadratic function of time is used as the explanatory variable.  From the county yield data the next step is to 
calculate the farm-level yield.  Long time series of farm-level data would be useful, but are not 
widely available.  The approach taken uses Risk Management Agency crop insurance yield 
insurance rates to derive a farm-level measure of riskiness for a representative farm in the county. 
The effective premium rate for 65 percent coverage crop insurance in each county is used to search 
for k in the formula: 
   Δyf = Δyc * k (1) 
where Δyf  is farm yield deviation from expectation, Δyc is the deviation from expected county 
yield and k is an expansion factor.  The expansion factor accounts for the aggregation effect, which 
leads to a riskier average farm yield in a county than the aggregate county yield.  Therefore, using 
the crop insurance premium rate, a grid search from 1.0 to 5.0 that increases by an interval of 0.2 
was used to find the yield variability that most closely approximates the crop insurance premium 
rate
1.  For example, Bolivar County in Mississippi has an expansion factor of 2.8 for cotton while 
cotton in Coahoma County, Mississippi, has an expansion factor of 2.4.  Once this equation is 
established, the matrix [Ycf] is created, which has county and farm yields with T1 rows for each 
year and N county columns. 
  The second stage of calculating farm revenue requires the creation of a matrix to represent 
relative price changes from the previous ending price.  This matrix will be represented by the 
symbol [Psit], derived by using the state harvest-time prices with T1 rows for years and M state 
columns.  Since the T1 row of price changes corresponds to the historical year of yield data given 
for the counties, the correlations between price and yield are implicitly maintained.  Although in an 
ideal environment county-level price data would be used, the data is not available to support the 
                                                 
1 Crop insurance is generally sold at the basic or optional unit level, which is typically more disaggregated than the 
farm.  Thus, the effective premium rate data is largely a mix of basic and optional unit rates.  The effective premium 
rates were adjusted downward by 15 percent to approximate farm-level variability.  use of county-level prices.  Therefore, state-level data for years 1975 to 2004 are used since this 
information can be obtained from NASS. 
  The actual simulation uses 500 random draws of a five-year time path.  Yields and prices 
for every location are drawn simultaneously to maintain the empirical correlations between prices 
and yields.  Starting prices are determined from December 2006 futures market prices for 2007 
delivery months.  The national marketing year average (MYA) price is obtained by taking a 
random price change draw that is multiplied by the previous year’s MYA price.  State prices are 
obtained by adjusting national price for a regional basis.  The simulation then models a five-year 
time path of random prices such that the expected price in year t is the MYA price for year t-1.  
This process is used for the remaining random draws.  Five hundred iterations are used, resulting 
in 2,500 random draws for each location (five years multiplied by 500 iterations). 
  The model then calculates the farm program payments using the simulated prices and 
yields.  This calculation requires additional information, and to calculate current programs such as 
direct payments, LDPs, and counter cyclical payments, several datasets are still needed.  A matrix 
containing planted acres is necessary to get per-acre calculations up to the farm level.  This 
information is obtained from NASS for the 2005 crop year.  The next data set used to form 
calculations is a 2002 base acres matrix from the Economic Research Service (ERS).  The third 
data set is a time series of ERS cost data used for calculating the National Corn Growers 
Association’s net revenue payments.  This data set provides a time series which is linearly 
regressed upon time to measure the residual variation in ERS’ regional cost data.  The cost data is 
broken down by regions that were redefined in 1996 so data for years prior to 1996 had to be matched with the more recent data.
2  A dummy variable intercept shifter is used to account for the 
1996 redefinition of the data. 
  The first step is calculating current program payments under the simulation.  These 
programs include direct payments, LDPs, and counter-cyclical payments.  The additional 
information needed to calculate LDPs is the loan rate parameter.   Table 1 displays the parameters 
used in the simulation.  To calculate loan deficiency payments (LDPs): 
BA SMYA LR y LDPs f * ) , 0 max( * − =    (2) 
LR stands for the loan rate, SMYA is the posted county price (the MYA price adjusted to a state-
level), and PA represents planted acres.  To calculate the direct payments (DP): 
BA DP DP y DP P R f * * * ˆ =    (3) 
where  is the predicted farm yield for 2006 f y ˆ
3, DPR is defined as the direct payment rate and DPP 
is the direct payment percentage.  The counter-cyclical payment (CCP) is calculated as: 
  f p R TP y CCP BA MYA LR DP CCP MAX CCP ˆ * * * )] , max( ( , 0 [ − − =    (4) 
CCP percentage is CCPP; CCPTP is the CCP target price.   
  The program is structured so that yield and revenue-based commodity programs can also be 
modeled.  Crop insurance is assumed to be insured at the 65 percent coverage level.  The next step 
is calculating the APH indemnity (APHi) using the following formula:   
) ˆ * , 0 max( * f f CL i y y APH EP APH − =    (5) 
where EP is the expected price and APHCL is the APH coverage level.  The NCGA-proposed 
program is divided into two tiers that differ in their coverage levels.  The first tier has a coverage 
                                                 
2 For soybeans Kansas and Nebraska were assumed to have the same cost as the adjoining states of Missouri and Iowa. 
3 This implicitly assumes base yields will be updated to current yield expectations. level of 70 percent while the second tier’s coverage level is 100 percent.  The net revenue (NR) is 
calculated by: 
       (6)  C y MYA NR f − = ) * (
The variable C stands for the cost in that region.  The expected net revenue (NRE) is calculated by: 
  06 * C y EP NR f E − = )     (7) 
where C06 is the predicted cost for 2006.  The net revenue guarantee is calculated by: 
E
CL
E NR BRP NR NRG * ) 1 ( − − =       (8) 
where BRP
CL is the BRP coverage level.  This equation subtracts a 30 percent deductible from 
expected revenue.  Because expected net revenue may be negative the deductible is computed 
using the absolute value of expected net revenue.  The following two equations use the previous 
calculations to calculate the indemnity payment for BRP and RCCP.   
) , 0 max( NR NRG BRP − =  and     (9) 
)) * ˆ * * , 0 max( , ˆ * * min( c c CL c
Cap y MYA y ETP RCCP y ETP RCCP RCCP − =  (10) 
where RCCP
Cap caps the amount of RCCP payments to 30 percent of the ETP, the effective target 
price (target price minus the direct payment rate) times expected county yield.  After deriving 
these formulas, taking them from a per-acre basis to a farm-level basis is the simple step of 
multiplying by planted acres.  
The final step is calculating total current payments and the payments of the National Corn 
Growers Association’s proposal.  Total current payments add direct payments, LDPs, counter-
cyclical payments, and APH indemnity payments and market revenue.  The National Corn 
Growers Association’s proposal adds direct payments, LDPs, BRP indemnity payments, and 
RCCP indemnity payments.  The fact these scenarios assume the NCGA proposal eliminates the 
current crop insurance program is of particular importance and is likely a strong assumption.  Similarly, a modified NCGA program is evaluated which eliminates the BRP and modifies the 
RCCP to a 95 percent guarantee.   
Results 
 
  Table 2 contains the summary statistics of the variables of interest.  The expected yield is 
averaged across the United States, which explains why the standard deviations are relatively high.  
In terms of the expected price, cotton’s mean value is higher than the loan rate but has a standard 
deviation that occasionally drops it below the loan rate.  Corn, however, was initiated with a 
relatively high price so that the average expected price is $3.73 per bushel, which even with a 
$1.07 standard deviation rarely drops low enough to trigger LDPs.  The county yield has a mean 
that closely follows the farm-level yield, but the standard deviation is lower in the county–which 
shows that the farm-level yield tends to pose more of a risk than the county-level yields.   
  Table 3 compares actual acres planted to simulated acres.  The cotton results reflect 
representative farms from counties that produce 70 percent of the national cotton production.  
Simulated corn counties represent 93 percent of the corn production in the United States.  The 
estimated acres for 2007 will be used in future calculations.  Cotton estimated acres for 2007 were 
assumed to be 90 percent of 2006 actual acres, whereas the 2007 estimated acres for corn were 
assumed to increase 11 percent.   
  Table 4 presents a summary of payments on a per-acre basis.  The original simulation 
results were based on the NCGA proposal, which includes a BRP coverage level of 70 percent and 
a RCCP coverage level of 100 percent.  The results indicate the NCGA proposal would pay out on 
average approximately $43 and $22 more per acre than current programs for cotton and corn, 
respectively.  These results show that to implement the NCGA proposal USDA would have to pay, 
based on the estimated 2007 acres, an extra $581,947,200 for cotton and $1,747,468,871 for corn.  The payments provided to farmers under the given proposal are such that the risk reduction 
generated by the NCGA proposal makes it an ostensibly attractive alternative for producers, but 
the cost to the government would likely be politically unacceptable.  Therefore, a modified version 
of the NCGA plan is simulated, with the difference being that BRP is eliminated and the RCCP 
coverage level is lowered from 100 percent to 95 percent.  These results are much more feasible in 
terms of relative cost, as average payments per acre drop under the modified NCGA plan.  Cotton 
payments decrease by approximately $45 per acre and corn payments fall by $11 per acre, which 
means that the baseline cost compared to current programs is also lower. 
  Table 4 shows the average payments per acre.  However, a closer look at what is happening 
around the U.S. and the magnitude of where payments are going can be seen in figures 1 – 4.  
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show a breakdown of average current payments per acre including crop 
insurance payments to the representative farm for each county.  Figure 1(a) shows the majority of 
cotton-producing farms receive $50 - $75 per acre, whereas figure 1(b) illustrates the greater 
variety in the magnitude of payments made to corn producers.  However, the most common 
payments per acre range from $25 - $50.  Figures 2(a) and (b) show the common payment rates of 
the base revenue protection plan.  Cotton tends to have higher payments and more variation, 
depending on location, than corn.  Corn payments appear to either have a low payment or a high 
payment as very few payments fall in the $30 – 60 range.  A reason for this gap is the method used 
for calculating costs.  Due to data constraints cost data were assumed to be the same in several 
states.  Figures 3(a) and (b) show how the current programs will almost always pay less than the 
proposed NCGA program.  Figures 4(a) and (b) show what happens under the modified NCGA 
program.  These maps have the largest disparity across crops, as the modified cotton program has 
payments often greater than $75, while corn payments tend to fall under $25 per acre. Conclusion 
  The model successfully represents multiple farms across the United States at one time 
while maintaining price and yield correlations so that aggregate outlays may be accurately 
represented as well.  Adding programs to the revenue simulation and then changing the 
specifications of these programs can also be easily accomplished. 
  The net revenue proposal is novel because it attempts to protect against shocks in input 
prices as well as output price and yield.  Our results find that cost risk is dominated by the 
magnitude of revenue risk but that net revenue guarantees rescale the indemnity trigger relative to 
the absolute variability of revenue and greatly increases the probability of a loss.   Conversely, a 95 
percent gross revenue guarantee based on county revenue appears to be relatively inexpensive 
compared to the current programs.  However, this assessment assumes elimination of the crop 
insurance program. 
Note that comparisons to current farm policy provisions are dramatically affected by 
current market prices.  As current corn price expectations are well above target price levels, the 
NCGA proposal with its effective target prices pays relatively less than a revenue guarantee based 
on current price expectations.  
  This analysis has numerous logical extensions that would provide a more complete picture 
of 2007 commodity program options.  A logical step in continuing the research is a sensitivity 
analysis of changing the parameters and extending the model to additional crops.  Interest in 
various wrap-around concepts that maintain some crop insurance programs also appears to be 
growing.  These designs would allow individual-level coverage that supplements area or 
nationally-triggered revenue shortfalls when such programs fail to compensate for idiosyncratic 
revenue losses.  Table 1. Simulation Parameters for Cotton and Corn 
 Cotton  Corn 
Beginning Expected Price  0.58 2.40
APH Coverage Level  0.70 0.70
BRP Coverage Level  0.85 0.85
RCCP Coverage Level  1.00 1.00
Modified RCCP Coverage Level  0.95 0.95
Loan Rate  0.52 1.95
Target Price  0.72 2.63
Direct Payment Rate  0.0667 0.28
Direct Payment Percentage  0.85 0.85
CCP Percentage  0.85 0.85
MPCI sub  0.59 0.59
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Cotton and Corn Simulated Variables 
   Cotton  Corn 
Expected Farm Yield  Mean  650.81  124.62 
 (Std.  Dev.)  (429.39)  (56.31) 
Expected Price  Mean  0.59  3.73 
 (Std.  Dev.)  (0.08)  (1.07) 
Market Year Avg. Price  Mean  0.60  3.86 
 (Std.  Dev.)  (0.11)  (1.34) 
County Yield  Mean  646.35  124.29 
 (Std.  Dev.)  (294.14)  (37.24) 
Gross Revenue  Mean  385.76  470.79 
 (Std.  Dev.)  (265.73)  (265.59) 
Area Cost  Mean  311.99  185.63 
 (Std.  Dev.)  (90.80)  (24.25) 
Net Revenue  Mean  73.81  290.38 
 (Std.  Dev.)  (233.88)  (267.45) 
 
Table 3. Acre Calculations 
 Cotton  Corn 
Actual 2006 Acres    15,200,000  78,300,000
Estimated 2007 Acres  13,680,000  87,000,000
Total 2006 acres in simulated counties  10,715,500  73,000,000
Simulated acres as a percent of 2006 planted  0.704967105  0.932311622
  
Table 4. Payment Levels on a per Planted Acre Bases 








Modified RCCP  $29.05 $3.91
Revenue with current programs  $511.43 $512.69
Revenue with NCGA  $553.97 $535.01
Revenue with Modified NCGA  $465.59 $501.12
 
NCGA – Current/ Acre  $42.54 $22.32
Modified RCCP – Current  -$45.84 -$11.58
        
Baseline cost/year – NCGA  $581,947,200 $1,747,468,871
Baseline cost/year – Modified NCGA  -$627,132,507 -$1,007,231,364
  




Figure 1b. Corn Current Payment Levels per Acre   




Figure 2b. Corn BRP Payment Levels per Acre  
Figure 3a.  Cotton Comparison Map: Current Programs vs. NCGA proposal  
 
 
Figure 3b. Corn Comparison Map: Current Programs vs. NCGA proposal 
 
  
Figure 4a. Cotton RCCP Payment Levels per Acre 
 
 
Figure 4b.  Corn RCCP Payment Levels per Acre References 
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